When rationale clauses correspond to a teleological construction

Abstract

This paper investigates which related properties to the individual on whom the modal orientation lies and to the predicate under its scope in rationale clauses “to p, have to/must/can q”. Our analysis follows a formal syntactic-semantic perspective, adopting Hacquard’s proposal (2006, 2010). We investigated the subjects and predicates of modal and infinitive sentences that integrate a rationale clause in order to understand which syntactic and/or semantic features license or restrict the teleological reading (of necessity/possibility) to the modal. Regarding the subject of the modal sentence, we found that it must have the same reference as the subject of the infinitive sentence and must exhibit the feature [+animated], but not necessarily the [+agent]. In relation to the predicate under the scope of the modal, we found that the teleological reading is available to the modal even if such predicate is marked with the feature [-control], since it exhibits the feature [+change].