Algorithmic platforms and economics of disinformation

Abstract

This article of theoretical reflection, which is anchored in bibliographic research, aims to demonstrate that the algorithmic platforms are propitious spaces to disinformation, given the way their technological characteristics are instrumentalized by their business model, resulting in the prevalence of the algorithm value over the news value. In order to apprehend such instrumentalization, as well as its effects on disinformation, the modus operandi of platforms is analyzed under four aspects. Unequal omnimediation is the proliferation of instances of mediation, each user acting to some extent as an influencer, while also being influenced by countless others. The arena of attention consists of the condition of permanent dispute among users, which supersedes the public sphere. Calibrated exposure designates – in lieu of selective exposure, echo chambers or filter bubbles – the weighted targeting of the content displayed to each user. And hybrid war machines are destabilizing mobilizations whose command is beyond the platforms’ control.