On the nature and place of the ideal in economics: György Lukács’ opposition to variations of objectivism and subjectivism

Abstract

The article identifies, exposes and discusses some of the strong theses of György Lukács in his Ontology, when
the author criticizes what he calls “a certain methodological dualism”, in objectivist and subjectivist theoretical variants, influential in the 20th century and repercussions in contemporary times, in any case, deforming the status and social categories, in formulations incapable of apprehending the nature, place and role of the “ideal in the economy”. The economy cannot be taken as a kind of “second nature”, since it is always influenced, in some way, from end to end, from its topical to profound
expressions, by pores and teleological processes of various types. On the other hand, the conceptions that deprive the material character of the objective categories, of the nexuses and of the tendential legalities of the economy, in elaborations and
variations that hypertrophy the forms of subjectivity, are nothing more than “ontological illusionism”. It is suggested that the original ways of philosophical approach to these problems, their equating and outline of answers, in terms of Ontology,
are of interest to those who are concerned, nowadays, with thinking and discussing the vicissitudes and challenges of the emancipation processes human society, as well as directing concrete, consistent struggles in that direction.