Political science and the financial system in Brazil: article 192 of the federal constitution doi: 10.5007/2175-7984.2010v9n17p173
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/%25xAbstract
The article reviews Brazilian Political Science literature on the non-regulation of the Federal Constitution (Article 192) and related themes, such as the relationship between monetary authority and Legislative Power and the political system and financial interest groups. After mapping four explanatoryhypotheses, we go on to present preliminary empirical research on the actions, decisions and non-decisions of Congress and of Executive Power related to normalization and regulation of the SFN (national financial system), as a means for evaluating the aforementioned hypotheses. We conclude that the hypotheses of non-decision and of “capture” have strong explanatory power; the hypothesis of state-centralized conduction exaggerates the degree of state autonomy and the hypothesis of Coalitional Presidentialism is overly formalist and is not able to explain institutional change.
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