Political science and the financial system in Brazil: article 192 of the federal constitution doi: 10.5007/2175-7984.2010v9n17p173

Authors

  • Marcus Ianoni Universidade Federal Fluminense

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/%25x

Abstract

The article reviews Brazilian Political Science literature on the non-regulation of the Federal Constitution (Article 192) and related themes, such as the relationship between monetary authority and Legislative Power and the political system and financial interest groups. After mapping four explanatory
hypotheses, we go on to present preliminary empirical research on the actions, decisions and non-decisions of Congress and of Executive Power related to normalization and regulation of the SFN (national financial system), as a means for evaluating the aforementioned hypotheses. We conclude that the hypotheses of non-decision and of “capture” have strong explanatory power; the hypothesis of state-centralized conduction exaggerates the degree of state autonomy and the hypothesis of Coalitional Presidentialism is overly formalist and is not able to explain institutional change.

Author Biography

Marcus Ianoni, Universidade Federal Fluminense

Mestre e Doutor em Sociologia Política pela PUC-SP. Professor Adjunto e Chefe
do Departamento de Ciência Política da Universidade Federal Fluminense
(Niterói/RJ).

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Published

2010-01-01

Issue

Vol. 9 No. 17 (2010)

Section

Thematic Dossier

License

The articles and other work published in Política & Sociedade, a journal associated to the Graduate Program in Sociology at UFSC, are the property of the journal. A new publication of the same text, whether by the initiative of the author or third parties, must indicate that it was previously published in this journal, citing the edition and date of publication.

 This work is licensed under the Creative Common License