The Intimate Harmony Between the Intellect and Sensibility: McDowell and Perceptual Learning

Autores/as

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2026.e103531

Palabras clave:

McDowell, Rationalism, Perceptual Learning, Perceptual Capacities, Conceptualism

Resumen

This paper argues for a shift in the debate surrounding McDowell's conceptualism: from contents to capacities. This shift is important because the conceptual nature of a capacity is revealed in the way the capacity figures in the life of the animal, in particular in how the animal acquires and sustains the capacity. More specifically, I argue that a capacity is conceptual insofar as the subject can improve it by systematically exploiting interconnections among the features involved in its exercise. I first develop this notion through an analysis of skillful action, showing how a skilled agent perceives the interlocking demands of a situation and uses this perception to refine her performance. I then extend the model to perception itself, arguing that perceptual learning exhibits the same structure: theoretical knowledge can reshape perceptual organization, bringing it under conceptual control. This yields what I call a systematically rational capacity, which, I argue, comes in degrees and is not specific to humans. I next examine McDowell's account of virtue, where practical wisdom is shown to consist in an intimate harmony between intellect and sensibility rather than a computation between independent components. I argue that this harmony, far from being restricted to the ethical domain, characterizes the relation between reason and sensibility in general: our intelligence just is the properly molded state of our perceptual capacities, reflectively adjusted. Finally, I turn to the role of language, which enables a degree of systematic integration unavailable to non-linguistic animals, and argue that language's deepest contribution is not merely representational but ethical, and that here we can find what is special about us: language initiates us into a shared form of life in which we matter to one another and have a say in shaping what matters.

Citas

Anscombe, Gertrude Elizabeth Marie. 1963. Intention. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Bakhurst, David. 2013. Moral Particularism: Ethical Not Metaphysical?. In: Thinking about Reasons: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy, p.192–217. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bermúdez, José Luis. 2020. Cognitive Science: An Introduction to the Science of the Mind. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Boyle, Matthew. 2012. Essentially Rational Animals. In: Rethinking Epistemology, v.2, p.395–427. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Boyle, Matthew. 2016. Additive Theories of Rationality: A Critique. European Journal of Philosophy 24: 527–555.

Brewer, Talbot. 2009. The Retrieval of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Burge, Tyler. 2003. Perceptual Entitlement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67(3): 503–548.

Burge, Tyler. 2011. Disjunctivism Again. Philosophical Explorations 14(1): 43–80.

Burge, Tyler. 2018. Iconic Representation: Maps, Pictures, and Perception. In: S. Wuppuluri; F.A. Doria (eds.), The Map and the Territory: Exploring the Foundations of Science, Thought and Reality, p.79–100. Berlin: Springer International Publishing.

Burge, Tyler. 2022. Perception: First Form of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Camp, Elisabeth. 2009. Putting Thoughts to Work: Concepts, Systematicity, and Stimulus-Independence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78(2): 275–311.

Carruthers, Peter. 2009. Invertebrate concepts confront the generality constraint (and win). In: R. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds, p.89–107. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cavell, Stanley Louis. 1962/2002. The Availability of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosphy. In: Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays, p.41–67. Updated. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chittka, Lars. 2022. The Mind of a Bee. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Chudnoff, Elijah. 2021. Forming Impressions: Expertise in Perception and Intuition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Clark, Andy. 2000. Word and Action: Reconciling Rules and Know-How in Moral Cognition. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 26: 267–289. Moral Epistemology Naturalized, ed. by R. Campbell and B. Hunter.

Connolly, Kevin. 2014). Perceptual Learning and the Contents of Perception. Erkenntnis 79(6): 1407–1418.

Connolly, Kevin. 2019. Perceptual Learning: The Flexibility of the Senses. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dancy, Jonathan Peter. 2004. Ethics Without Principles. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Douskos, Christos. 2019. The Varieties of Agential Powers. European Journal of Philosophy 27(4): 982–1001.

Dreyfus, Hubert Lederer. 2005. Overcoming the Myth of the Mental: How Philosophers Can Profit from the Phenomenology of Everyday Expertise. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 79(2): 47–65.

Dreyfus, Hubert Lederer. 2007a. Detachment, Involvement, and Rationality: Are We Essentially Rational Animals?. In: Human Affairs 17: 101–109.

Dreyfus, Hubert Lederer. 2007b. Response to McDowell. Inquiry 50(4): 371–377.

Dreyfus, Hubert Lederer. 2007c. The Return of the Myth of the Mental. Inquiry 50(4): 352–365.

Dreyfus, Hubert Lederer. 2013. The Myth of the Pervasiveness of the Mental. In: J.K. Schear (ed.), Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate, p.15–40. New York: Routledge.

Elzinga, Benjamin. 2018. Self-regulation and knowledge how”. Episteme 15(1): 119–140.

Elzinga, Benjamin. 2023. Know-how and why self-regulation will not go away. Synthese 201. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04168-5.

Frankfurt, Harry Gordon. 1998 [1982]. The Importance of What We Care About. The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays, p.80-94. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Frankfurt, Harry Gordon. 1998 [1987]. Identification and wholeheartedness. In: The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays, p.159-176. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Haugeland, John. 1998 [1981]. Analog and Analog. In: Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of the Mind, p.171-206. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Haugeland, John. 1998 [1991]. Representational Genera. In: Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of the Mind, p.75-88. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Hieronymi, Pamela. 2019. I’ll Bet You Think This Blame is About You. In: D.J. Coates; N. Tognazzini (eds.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 5: Essays on Themes from the Work of Gary Watson, p.60-87. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hieronymi, Pamela. 2022. Agency and Responsibility. In: L. Ferrero (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Agency, p.279-287. New York: Routledge.

Hieronymi, Pamela. 2024. Taking Responsibility, Defensiveness, and the Blame Game. In: R. Chang; A. Srinivasan (eds.), Conversations in Philosophy, Law, and Politics, p.151–165. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hurley, Susan Lynn. 2003. Animal Action in the Space of Reasons. Mind and Language 18(3): 231–256.

Hurley, Susan Lynn; Noë, Alva. 2003. Neural Plasticity and Consciousness. Biology and Philosophy 18: 131–168.

Hyman, John. 1999. How Knowledge Works. Philosophical Quarterly 49: 433–451.

Hyman, John. 2015. Action, Knowledge, and Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jackson, Gabrielle Bennette. 2020. Gilbert Ryle’s Adverbialism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 28(2): 318–335.

Jenkin, Zoe. 2023. Perceptual Learning. Philosophy Compass 18(6): e12932. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12932.

Kremer, Michael. 2017. A Capacity to Get Things Right: Gilbert Ryle on Knowledge. European Journal of Philosophy 25(1): 25–46.

Lande, Kevin J. 2021. Mental Structures. Noûs 55(3): 649–677. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12324.

Lotfi, Shidan. 2009. Wittgenstein’s Rule-Following Considerations and Moral Particularism. Theoria 75(2): 100–116.

Matthen, Mohan. 2005. Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

McDowell, John Henry. 1996. Mind and World. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

McDowell, John Henry. 1998. Some Issues in Aristotle’s Moral Psychology. In: Mind, Value, and Reality, p.23-49. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

McDowell, John Henry. 1998 [1978]. Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?. In: Mind, Value, and Reality, p.77-94. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

McDowell, John Henry. 1998 [1979]. Virtue and Reason. In: Mind, Value, and Reality, p.50-73. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

McDowell, John Henry. 2007a. Response to Dreyfus. Inquiry 50(4): 366–370.

McDowell, John Henry. 2007b. What Myth?. Inquiry 50(4): 338–351.

McDowell, John Henry. 2009 [1996]. Deliberation and Moral Development in Aristotle’s Ethics. In: The Engaged Intellect: Philosophical Essays, p.41-58. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

McDowell, John Henry. 2013. The Myth of the Mind as Detached. In: J.K. Schear (ed.), Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate, p.41-58. New York: Routledge.

McDowell, John Henry. 2017. Rationalism without Dogmas. In: Z. Adams; J. Browning (eds.), Giving a Damn: Essays in Dialogue with John Haugeland, p.311-328. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

McDowell, John Henry. 2018a. Sellars and the Space of Reasons. Analysis. Claves de Pensamiento Contemporáneo 21(8): 1–22.

McDowell, John Henry. 2018b. Travis on Frege, Kant, and the Given: Comments on ‘Unlocking the Outer World’. In: J. Gersel et al. (ed.), In the Light of Experience: New Essays on Perception and Reason, p.23–35. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Moran, Richard. 2017 [2002]. Frankfurt on Identification: Ambiguities of Activity in Mental Life. In: The Philosophical Imagination: Selected Essays, p.136-157. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Moran, Richard. 2017 [2007]. On Frankfurt’s The Reasons of Love”. In: The Philosophical Imagination: Selected Essays, p.158-168. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nielsen, Karen Margrethe. 2015. Aristotle on principles in ethics: political science as the science of the human good. In: Bridging the Gap between Aristotle’s Science and Ethics, p.29-48. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

O’callaghan, Casey. 2022. Perception, Flux and Learning. Analysis 82(3): 560–571.

Reboul, Anne. 2017. Cognition and Communication in the Evolution of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ryle, Gilbert. 1949/2009. The Concept of Mind. New York: Routledge.

Ryle, Gilbert. 1971. Thinking and Self-Teaching. Journal of Philosophy as Education 5(2): 216–28.

Ryle, Gilbert. 1993. Aspects of Mind. Ed. by R. Meyer. Oxford: Blackwell.

Santos, Laurie R.; Hood, Bruce. 2009. Object Representation as a Central Issue in Cognitive Science. In: The Origins of Object Knowledge, p.1-23. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schellenberg, Susanna. 2018. The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sellars, Wilfrid Stalker. 1956/1991. Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. In: Science, Perception and Reality, p.127-196. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Company.

Sharp, Daniel. 2016. The Rule-Following Considerations and the Case for Moral Particularism: A Critical Examination. Ethical Perspectives 23(3): 411–443.

Shea, Nicholas. 2014. Exploitable Isomorphism and Structural Representation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114: 123–144.

Sliwa, Paulina. 2024. Taking Responsibility. In: R. Chang; A. Srinivasan (eds.), Conversations in Philosophy, Law, and Politics, p.129-150. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Spelke, Elizabeth Shilin. 2022. What Babies Know, Volume 1: Core Knowledge and Composition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sprague, Elmer. 1999. Persons and Their Minds: A Philosophical Investigation. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

Stokes, Dustin. 2021a. On Perceptual Expertise. Mind and Language 36: 241–263.

Stokes, Dustin. 2021b. Thinking and Perceiving: On the Malleability of the Mind. London: Routledge.

Strawson, Peter Frederick. 1959. Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London: Methuen.

Strawson, Peter Frederick. 2008 [1962]. Freedom and Resentment. In: Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays, p.1-28. New York: Routledge.

Vogler, Candace A. 2002. Reasonably Vicious. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Publicado

2026-08-12