Philosophy and Neuroscience: Tango or Solo Dancing?

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2026.e106055

Keywords:

Philosophy, Neuroscience, Relationship, Metaphilosophy, Experimental Philosophy´

Abstract

In this paper, I want to briefly introduce how four approaches that relate (or not) philosophical investigation with the neuroscientific research can be considered in order to achieve a methodology that can effectively investigate the phenomenon of the conscious mind and its relationship with the brain. The traditional way of defining philosophical work seems to be clearly opposed to the traditional way of conceiving neuroscientific work. That raises the question that serves as the title of the paper: should we conceive the relationship between philosophy and neuroscience as a kind of “solo dancing”, that is, isolated without any kind of interaction? Or should we conceive that relationship as a “tango”, that is, an actively continuous relationship that complements each other? The Isolationist Approach argues for a “solo dancing” relationship, denying any kind of interaction. Next, rejecting this “solo dancing” approach, the Reductionist Approach (RA) will focus on specifying how philosophical work can be reduced to neuroscientific work. Arguing against the reductive aspect of (RA), but maintain a “tango” relationship, the Neurophenomenological Approach (NA) will demonstrate the importance of an embodied approach to the study of the conscious mind. Finally, the Non-Reductive Neurophilosophical Approach (NRNA) will expose a particular methodology that conceives the epistemic utility of both philosophical and neuroscientific work to investigate the conscious brain. After this brief reflection, we will provide some experimental philosophy data collected on how experts in neurophilosophy (broadly considered) judge this relationship, showing that there is a preference for approaches that interconnect both disciplines (even if the specific kind of interconnections is not particular).

 

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Published

2026-03-25

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Section

Special Issue: 40 years of Patricia Churchland’s Neurophilosophy