Overinterpreting Logics

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2025.e107901

Keywords:

Paraconsistent Logic, Dialetheism, Epistemic Interpretation, Modalism, Empiricism

Abstract

Paraconsistent logics, minimally, are not explosive; that is, on these logics, not everything follows from a contradiction of the form ‘A and not-A’. Dialetheists, who argue that some contradictions are true (Priest [2006]), have philosophically interpreted such logics as supporting the existence of true contradictions, since they allow for the possibility of true contradictions without triviality. In this paper, I provide basic criteria for philosophical interpretations of logics and consider the costs of violating such criteria, especially by engaging in logical overinterpretation. I argue that overinterpretation supports metaphysical or epistemological readings of logics that are not called for and that can be resisted on philosophically independent grounds. A more neutral, modalist-empiricist stance toward logics in general, and of paraconsistent logics in particular, is then advanced.

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Published

2025-07-17

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Section

Special Issue on the Interpretation of Paraconsistent Logics