Once More Unto The Breach: Strawson's Anti-sceptical View


  • Marco Antonio Franciotti Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina




In this article, I am intent on rehabilitating Strawson's overall anti-sceptical strategy. First, I focus on his earlier attempt, which ignited the debate about the adequacy of transcendental arguments against the sceptic. I present Stroud's main reservation that Strawson's viewpoint is unworkable because it does not take into consideration the view of the external world upon which the sceptic is based in order to challenge our knowledge claims. I then focus on Strawson's later attempt, which is based upon a Humean-like naturalistic strategy. I show that his naturalism is intractable for two reasons: first because it reproduces the proof structure of transcendental arguments and ends up employing a rational proof to counter rational proofs; and second, because it matches the sceptic's advice
that we should live according to our natural inclinations without ever trying to justify our beliefs. In the last section, I claim that it is possible to rehabilitate transcendental arguments as sound anti-sceptical proofs if we argue for the senselessness of the idea of thing in itself completely apart from our powers of conceptualisation.

Author Biography

Marco Antonio Franciotti, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina

Possui graduação em Jornalismo pela Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (1981) , mestrado em Mestrado Em Lógica e Filosofia da Ciência pela Universidade Estadual de Campinas (1989) e doutorado em Doutorado Em Filosofia pela University of London (1995) . Atualmente é Professor Adjunto IV da Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina. Tem experiência na área de Filosofia , com ênfase em História da Filosofia. Atuando principalmente nos seguintes temas: ceticismo, Certeza, conhecimento, transcendental.