Julius Konig et les Principes Aristoteliciens


  • Marcel Guillaume Université de Clermont-Ferrand II




In his posthumous book from 1914, "New foundations of logic, arithmetic and set theory", Julius Konig develops his philosophy of mathematics. In a previous contribution, we attracted attention on the positive part (his truth and falsehood predicates being excluded) of his "pure logic": his "isology" being assimilated to mutual implication, it constitutes a genuine formalization of positive intuitionistic logic. Konig's intention was to rebuild logic in such a way that the excluded third's principle could no longer be logical. However, his treatment of truth and falsehood (boiling down to negation) is purely classical. We explain here this discrepancy by the choice of the alleged more primitive notions to which the questioned notions of truth and falsehood have been reduced. Finaly, it turns out that the disjunctive and conjunctive forms of the principles of the excluded third and of contradiction have effectively been excluded, but none of their implicative forms.

Author Biography

Marcel Guillaume, Université de Clermont-Ferrand II

Professor Emeritus, Université de Clermont-Ferrand (France). Laboratoire de Logique, Algorithmique et Informatique, Université de Clermont-Ferrand 1, France.