Acerca da taxonomia do mental para contextos que requerem neutralidade

Filipe Lazzeri

Abstract


Ordinary psychological (or mental) predicates, and the phenomena we report to by means of them, can be grouped together into different categories. For instance, it is usual to group together phenomena such as belief and expectancy in a category of ‘propositional attitudes’, whereas sensations, like pain and itch, in a distinct one. Which taxonomy of the mental would be plausible to be adopted in contexts such as those of introductory books to the philosophy of mind, i.e., when we need to set out only from minimal assumptions regarding these predicates and phenomena? This article (1) suggests some desiderata and principles for such a taxonomy; (2) exposes and critically assesses some taxonomies presented in introductory books to the philosophy of mind; and (3) proposes the sketch of an alternative one (for the same kind of context).


Keywords


Psychological categories; taxonomy of the mental; philosophy of mind.



DOI: https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n3p365

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Principia: an internationnal journal of epistemology
Published by NEL - Epistemology and Logic Research Group
Federal University of Santa Catarina - UFSC
Center of Philosophy and Human Sciences – CFH
Campus Reitor João David Ferreira Lima
Florianópolis, Santa Catarina - Brazil
CEP: 88040-900

 ISSN: 1414-4217
EISSN: 1808-171

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