Proposta de argumento contra o naturalismo metafísico

Authors

  • Domingos Faria Universidade de Lisboa

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2014v18n3p361

Keywords:

Plantinga, naturalism, theism, self-defeater, metaphysics

Abstract

In this paper I present a proposal to reformulate the argument of Alvin Plantinga (2011) against metaphysical naturalism. Contrary to Plantinga’s argument, in this new version I propose to consider the probability of the reliability of cognitive faculties, not with regard to any kind of beliefs, but only with respect to metaphysical beliefs. I claim that those who accept naturalism have a defeater for the belief that their cognitive faculties are reliable with respect to metaphysical beliefs and, thus, they have a defeater for any of their metaphysical beliefs, including the belief in metaphysical naturalism. Therefore, those who accept naturalism have a defeater for naturalism; in other words, metaphysical naturalism is self-defeating.

Author Biography

Domingos Faria, Universidade de Lisboa

LanCog Research Group CFUL Universidade de Lisboa

Published

2014-12-12

Issue

Section

Articles