Can dispositionalism about belief vindicate doxasticism about delusion?


  • José Eduardo Porcher Post-Doctoral Fellow (PNPD/CAPES) Universidade Federal do Paraná Brasil



Clinical delusions have traditionally been characterized as beliefs in psychiatry. However, philosophers have recently engaged with the empirical literature and produced a number of objections to the so-called doxastic status of delusion, stemming mainly from the mismatch between the functional role of delusions and that expected of beliefs. In response to this, an appeal to dispositionalism about the nature of belief has been proposed to vindicate the doxastic status of delusion. In this paper, I first present the objections to attributing beliefs to delusional patients and the application of dispositionalism in the attempt to vindicate doxasticism. I then assess this application and some responses to the objections to the doxastic characterization. Finally, I offer some conclusions about the limits of folk-psychological concepts in the characterization and explanation of complex psychological phenomena such as delusions.

Author Biography

José Eduardo Porcher, Post-Doctoral Fellow (PNPD/CAPES) Universidade Federal do Paraná Brasil

Pesquisador de Pós-Doutorado (PNPD/CAPES) vinculado ao Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia da Universidade Federal do Paraná. Bacharel, Mestre e Doutor em Filosofia pela Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul.