Putnam, Kuhn e a relatividade conceitual
The understanding of conceptual relativity in Putnam’s and Kuhn’s writings should not be restricted to the claim that the existence is relative to, but not in virtue of, a conceptual scheme. This approach does not capture some significant differences between their positions about the notion of conceptual scheme. We understand that the thesis of conceptual relativity contains a statement about the close relationship between conceptual scheme and content, and another claim about the differences between conceptual schemes. Based on these two formal requirements, we propose a reconstruction of the Putnam’s treatment of it and show how it can be understood from Kuhn’s perspective of scientific development. We defend that, although both fulfill a critical role against metaphysical realism, they are applied to distinct domains: while Putnam’s conceptual relativity is in the record of the conceptual structure of scientific theories and presupposes a choice between cognitively equivalent conceptual schemes, Kuhn considers the field of the dynamics of development of science. Thus, we note relevant scientific cases of conceptual relativity that do not involve semantic incommensurability.
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