Analytic and synthetic based on the paradox of knowability

Authors

  • Nicola D'Alfonso Independent Scholar, Italy

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n1p79

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to show how the paradox of knowability loses its paradoxical character when we correctly interpret one of its premises. It is then shown how this new interpretation can be used to logically define analytical and synthetic truths. In this way, the paradox of knowability is traced back to the harmless affirmation that, in order to know every proposition with certainty, there must be no propositions whose truth is synthetic.

Author Biography

Nicola D'Alfonso, Independent Scholar, Italy

Independent Scholar, Italy

References

Wilbur Dyre, Hart (1979), The Epistemology of Abstract Objects: Access and Inference, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary 53, pp.153-165

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Published

2019-04-26

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Section

Articles