Analytic and synthetic based on the paradox of knowability

Nicola D'Alfonso


The purpose of this paper is to show how the paradox of knowability loses its paradoxical character when we correctly interpret one of its premises. It is then shown how this new interpretation can be used to logically define analytical and synthetic truths. In this way, the paradox of knowability is traced back to the harmless affirmation that, in order to know every proposition with certainty, there must be no propositions whose truth is synthetic.


Paradox of knowability; synthetic truths; analytical truths; principle of the factivity; knowledge; certain knowledge

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Wilbur Dyre, Hart (1979), The Epistemology of Abstract Objects: Access and Inference, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary 53, pp.153-165


Copyright (c) 2019 Nicola D'Alfonso

Principia: an internationnal journal of epistemology
Published by NEL - Epistemology and Logic Research Group
Federal University of Santa Catarina - UFSC
Center of Philosophy and Human Sciences – CFH
Campus Reitor João David Ferreira Lima
Florianópolis, Santa Catarina - Brazil
CEP: 88040-900

 ISSN: 1414-4217
EISSN: 1808-171