Analytic and synthetic based on the paradox of knowability
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n1p79Resumen
The purpose of this paper is to show how the paradox of knowability loses its paradoxical character when we correctly interpret one of its premises. It is then shown how this new interpretation can be used to logically define analytical and synthetic truths. In this way, the paradox of knowability is traced back to the harmless affirmation that, in order to know every proposition with certainty, there must be no propositions whose truth is synthetic.Citas
Wilbur Dyre, Hart (1979), The Epistemology of Abstract Objects: Access and Inference, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary 53, pp.153-165
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2019-04-26
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