The Limits of Modal Knowledge
Modal agnosticism is the view that we must be agnostic about whether things could have turned out differently. I argue that claims about unrealised possibilities (what I term ‘merely metaphysical modal claims’) are not justified by our modal intuitions, nor are they justified by any of the means proposed by philosophers. It follows that we do not have merely metaphysical modal knowledge, and that we must adopt modal agnosticism.
Armstrong, David M. 1989. A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gallagher, James. 2015. ‘Aphantasia: A life without mental images’. BBC News. 26 August, 2015. URL: http://www.bbc.com/news/health-34039054 [online]. (Accessed: 21 April, 2017.)
Bennett, Jonathan F. 2000. Infallibility and Modal Knowledge in Some Early Modern Philosophers. In Mathematics and Necessity: Essays in the History of Philosophy. Edited by Timothy Smiley. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 139-166.
Bloch, Ernst. 1988. Something’s Missing: A Discussion between Ernst Bloch and Theodor Adorno on the Contradictions of Utopian Longing. In The Utopian Functions of Art and Literature: Selected Essays. Translated by Zipes, Jack & Mecklenburg, Frank. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press. pp. 1-17.
Bueno, Otávio & Shalkowski, Scott A. 2014. ‘Modalism and Theoretical Virtues: Toward an Epistemology of Modality’. Philosophical Studies. 172(3): 671-689.
Byrne, Alex. 2007. ‘Possibility and Imagination’. Philosophical Perspectives. 21(1): 125-144.
Chalmers, David J. 2002. ‘Does conceivability entail possibility?’ In Conceivability and Possibility. Edited by Gendler, Tamar S. &
Hawthorne, John. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 145-200.
Dasgupta, Shamik. 2016. ‘Metaphysical Rationalism’. Noûs. 50(2): 379-418.
Divers, John. 2004. ‘Agnosticism about Other Worlds: A New Antirealist Programme in Modality’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 69(3): 660-685.
Evenson, Brian. 2009. The Third Factor. In Fugue State: Stories. Minneapolis, MN: Coffee House Press.
Kahneman, Daniel & Tversky, Amos. 1979. ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk’. Econometrica. 47(2): 263-292.
Kripke, Saul A. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Lewis, David K. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lowe, Edward J. 2012. ‘What is the Source of Our Knowledge of Modal Truths?’ Mind. 121(484): 919-950.
Menzel, Christopher. 2016. ‘Possible Worlds’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Winter 2016 edition. Edited by Zalta, Edward N. URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/possible-worlds/ [online]. (Accessed 23 July, 2017.)
Moore, George E. 2013 (1993). G.E. Moore: Selected Writings. Edited by Baldwin, Thomas. Oxford: Routledge.
Nozick, Robert. 2001. Invariances: The Structure of the Objective World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Oaksford, Mike & Chater, Nick. 2001. ‘The probabilistic approach to human reasoning’. TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences. 5(8): 349-357.
Rinaldi, Fiori. 1967. ‘Logical Possibility’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 28(1): 81-99.
Roca-Royes, Sonia. 2017. Similarity and Possibility: An Epistemology of de re Possibility for Concrete Entities. In Modal Epistemology After Rationalism. Edited by Fisher, Bob & Leon, Felipe. Cham: Springer. pp. 221-246.
Smith, Quentin. 2001. ‘The Metaphysical Necessity of Natural Laws’. Philosophica. 67(1): 31-55.
Vaidya, Anand. 2017. ‘The Epistemology of Modality’. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Summer 2017 edition. Edited by Zalta, Edward N. URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/modality-epistemology/ [online]. (Accessed: 28 April, 2017.)
van Inwagen, Peter. 1998. ‘Modal Epistemology’. Philosophical Studies: A Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition. 92(1/2): 67-84.
Williamson, Timothy. 2005. ‘The Presidential Address: Armchair Philosophy, Metaphysical Modality and Counterfactual Thinking’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 105: 1-23.
Williamson, Timothy. 2007. Philosophical Knowledge and Knowledge of Counterfactuals. In Philosophical Knowledge: Its Possibility and Scope. Edited by Beyer, Christian & Burri, Alex. Amsterdam: Rodopi. pp. 89-123.
Williamson, Timothy. 2007. The Philosophy of Philosophy. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Yablo, Stephen. 1993. ‘Is conceivability a guide to possibility?’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 53(1): 1-42.
Principia http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/index is licenced under a Creative Commons - Atribuição-Uso Não-Comercial-Não a obras derivadas 3.0 Unported.
Base available in www.periodicos.ufsc.br.