The limits of modal knowledge
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n2p323Resumo
In this essay I defend a nuanced but wide-reaching version of modal scepticism. I argue that claims about unrealised possibilities (part of an area that I term ‘merely metaphysical modality’), unless logically (or analytically) impossible, are not justified by our intuitions, nor are they justified by any other means proposed by philosophers. I further suggest that it is likely that we have epistemic access only to this reality, the ‘actual world’. It follows that, while we have modal knowledge pertaining to actualities (i.e., what has been realised) and impossibilities (i.e., what cannot be realised), we lack merely metaphysical modal knowledge (i.e., what has not been realised and is not ruled out by the prescripts of logic).Referências
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