Neither a Truism nor a Triviality: Reply to Grzankowski
This is a reply to Alex Grzankowski’s comment on my paper, ‘To Believe is to Believe True’. I argue that one may believe a proposition to be true without possessing the concept of truth. I note that to believe the proposition P to be true is not the same as to believe the proposition ‘P is true’. This avoids the regress highlighted by Grzankowski in which the concept of truth is employed an infinite number of times in a single belief.
GRZANKOWSKI, A. 2019. To Believe is Not to Believe True: Reply to Sankey. Principia 23(1): 137–8.
SANKEY, H. 2019. To Believe is to Believe True. Principia, 23(1): 131–6.
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