Neither a Truism nor a Triviality: Reply to Grzankowski

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n2p361

Abstract

This is a reply to Alex Grzankowski’s comment on my paper, ‘To Believe is to Believe True’. I argue that one may believe a proposition to be true without possessing the concept of truth. I note that to believe the proposition P to be true is not the same as to believe the proposition ‘P is true’. This avoids the regress highlighted by Grzankowski in which the concept of truth is employed an infinite number of times in a single belief.

Author Biography

Howard Sankey, University of Melbourne

Associate Professor

Philosophy 

References

GRZANKOWSKI, A. 2019. To Believe is Not to Believe True: Reply to Sankey. Principia 23(1): 137–8.

SANKEY, H. 2019. To Believe is to Believe True. Principia, 23(1): 131–6.

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Published

2019-08-16

Issue

Section

Notes/Discussions