Thomas Reid’s objection to Locke’s Theory of personal identity
The paper aims to present two distinct ways of defending John Locke’s theory of personal identity from Thomas Reid’s objection. First, it will be argued that this objection is not effective since it starts from a misunderstanding of Locke’s theory. The identity of a person is not preserved by the psychological continuity of consciousness, as Reid understood it, but by its ontological continuity: the existence of the same consciousness preserves the personal identity. Secondly, it will be argued that it is possible to reply to that objection in the light of the observation that the personal identity is preserved by the identity of the man: person and man are connected by means of the notion of body.
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