McDowell's revised view of perceptual experience and the threat of the "pluralism anxiety"

Authors

  • Naiana dos Anjos Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte - UFRN
  • José Frota Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte - UFRN
  • Federico Sanguinetti UFRN - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2020v24n2p459

Keywords:

Experiência perceptual;, McDowell; , pluralismo

Abstract

In his essayAvoiding the Myth of the Given(AMG), McDowell gives a new charac-terization both of the content of perceptual experience and of the way in which it enables asubject to know. This new characterization has been charged to give rise to a “pluralism anxi-ety”. The goal of this paper is to explore in detail possible problems linked with the pluralismthat arise from McDowell’s change of mind about the content of perceptual experience, andto evaluate whether McDowell has conceptual resources to avoid them. The structure of thepaper will be the following: first we will reconstruct in detail McDowell’s revised view on per-ceptual experience as it is presented in AMG; then, we will reconstruct arguments in supportof the claim that McDowell’s revised position could give rise to a pluralism anxiety; finallyyet importantly we will discuss whether it is possible to offer an interpretation of McDowell’sposition which offers a way out of such difficulties.

References

Burge, T. 2003. Perceptual Entitlement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67: 503–548.

Connolly, K. 2014. Which Kantian Conceptualism (or Nonconceptualism)? The Southern Journalof Philosophy 52(3): 16–337.

Corti, L. 2017. La terapia incompleta di John McDowell: ansie pluraliste e ansie storiche. In L. Corti & G. Miolli (org.), Hegel e McDowell. Esperienza, verità, normatività, pp.49–67. Padova: Verifiche.

Dupré, J. 1993. The Disorder of Things. Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

El Kassar, N. 2015. Towards a Theory of Epistemically Significant Perception. How We Relate to the World. Berlin: DeGruyter.

Lauer, David. 2014. Offenheit zur Welt. Die Auflösung des Dualismus von Begriff und Anschauung. In Ch. Barth & D. Lauer (orgs.), Die Philosophie John McDowells, pp.37–62. Muenster: Mentis.

McDowell, John. 2005 [1996]. Mente e Mundo [MM]. Trad. J. V. Gallerani Cuter. São Paulo: Ideias e Letras.

McDowell, John. 2008. Avoiding the Myth of the Given [AMG]. In J. Lindgaard (org.), John McDowell: Experience, Norm, and Nature, pp.1–14. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

McDowell, John. 2009. Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars [HWV]. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

McDowell, John. 2018. Travis on Frege, Kant and the Given. In J. Gersel et al. (orgs.), In the Light of Experience: New Essays on Perception and Reasons, pp.24–36. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Philie, Patrice. 2015. Sellars and McDowell on Objectivity. Kriterion — Journal of Philosophy 29(3): 63–92.

Pippin, Robert. 2007. McDowell’s Germans: Response to ‘On Pippin’s Postscript’. European Journal of Philosophy 15(3): 411–434.

Redding, Paul. 2018. Hegel and McDowell on Perceptual Experience and Judgment. In F. Sanguinetti & A. Abath (orgs.), McDowell and Hegel: Perceptual Experience, Thought and Action, pp.117–132. Switzerland: Springer.

Williams, Michael. 2006. Science and Sensibility: McDowell and Sellars on Perceptual Experience. European Journal of Philosophy 14(2): 302–325.

Published

2020-11-18

Issue

Section

Articles