David Hume on the Corporeal Dimension of the Self





David Hume, Personal Identity, Self, Mind, Body


The paper advances the hypothesis that David Hume’s philosophy explains the corporeal dimension of the self, particularly, one’s belief in a body as being ‘her own body’, as a part of one’s self, in light of three different perspectives: through the operations of the imagination, the associative principles and the perception of mental and physical parallel states; through the occurrence of certain passions in the mind, particularly, pride, humility, and self-interest which direct one’s attention to a body that is felt to be her own body; through the consciousness of the ability of the will to guide the power of moving certain parts of the body. Finally, it is argued that the mental phenomenon of belief in one's own body is a mutual construction of the human mind, that is, it is produced simultaneously by intellectual, affective, and volitional operations.

Author Biography

Vinícius França , Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais e Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

Possui graduação em Filosofia (Bacharelado e Licenciatura) pela Universidade Federal de Uberlândia (2010), mestrado em Filosofia pela Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (2012) e doutorado em Filosofia pela Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais e pela Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (2017). Atualmente, é pós-doutorando (PNPD / CAPES) na Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais.


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