A Conciliatory Interpretation of the Meaning of Value Judgements in David Hume’s Philosophy
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e89990Keywords:
David Hume, Moral Value, Aesthetic Value, Descriptivism, ExpressivismAbstract
In this paper, I present an interpretation about the meaning of value judgements (moral and aesthetic) in the philosophy of David Hume. I state that although they are essentially descriptive of a fact (a sentiment that any spectator placed in the disinterested point of view can feel), these judgements also express a particular sentiment, at least in some cases. To achieve this aim, after introducing the questions and interpretative possibilities approached (section 1), I explain the interpretations called expressivist (mainly, its projectivist subtype, commonly called ‘error theory’) and descriptivist (and its subtypes, called subjectivist and causalist), as well as the problems of accepting each one of them univocally (respectively, sections 2 and 3). Then, I argue in favor of an hybrid or conciliating interpretation according to which Hume’s philosophy is better understood as a form of descriptivism, while preserving an expressivist feature, based on the possibility of solving those problems (section 4).
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