Williamson on vagueness, the margin of error principle, and the KK principle
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e90374Keywords:
Williamson on Vagueness, Principle of the Epistemic Margin of Error, Inexact Knowledge, SoritesAbstract
Williamson maintains that knowledge of vague propositions is only possible if a certain principle of epistemic margin of error is satisfied.Williamson employs such a principle to explain the ignorance of the non-omniscient mind of borderline cases of vague concepts and in the treatment of soritic arguments. In elaborating his argument in favor of a principle of margin of error, Williamson also makes efforts in an attempt to refute the KK principle. In this essay, we raise some difficulties for Williamson’s approach.
References
Cohen, M. 2023. The uncoordinated teachers puzzle. Episteme 1-8. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2023.6
Evans, G. 1978. Can there be vague objects?. Analysis 38(4): 208.
Gómez-Torrente, M. 2002. Vagueness and margin for error principles. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64(1): 107-125.
Graff, D. 2002. An anti-epistemicist consequence of margin for error semantics for Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64(1): 127-142.
Hintikka, J. 1970. “Knowing that One Knows” reviewed. Synthese 21: 141-162.
Hyde, D. 2011. The sorites paradox. In: G. Ronzitti (ed.), Vagueness: a guide, p.1-18. Dordrecht: Springer.
Hyde, D. & Raffman, D. 2018. Sorites paradox. In: E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Summer 2018 Edition. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/sorites-paradox/. Acesso 15/12/2021.
Machina, K. & Deutsch, H. 2002. Vagueness, ignorance, and margins for error. Acta Analytica 17(29): 19-45.
Mahtani, A. 2008. Williamson on inexact knowledge. Philosophical Studies 139: 171-180.
Mates, B. 1981. Skeptical essays. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Mott, P. 1998. Margins for error and the sorites paradox. The Philosophical Quarterly 48(193): 494-504.
Sainsbury, M. R. 2009. Paradoxes. 3ª ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sainsbury, M. & Williamson, T. 2017. Sorites. In: B. Hale; C. Wright; A. Miller, A. (ed.), A companion to the philosophy of language, 2ª ed., p.734-757. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons.
Sorensen, R. 1988. Dogmatism, junk knowledge, and conditionals. The Philosophical Quarterly 38(153): 433-454.
Sorensen, R. 2001. Vagueness and contradiction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Valcarenghi, E. C. 2022. A resolução do paradoxo do teste surpresa. Aufklärung 9(1): 11-42.
Williamson, T. 1992a. Inexact knowledge. Mind, new series 101(402): 217-242.
Williamson, T. & Simons, P. 1992b. Vagueness and ignorance. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary volumes 66: 145-177.
Williamson, T. 2000a. Knowledge and its limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williamson, T. 2000b. Margins for error: a reply. The Philosophical Quarterly 50(198): 76-81.
Williamson, T. 2001. Vagueness. London and New York: Taylor & Francis e-Library.
Williamson, T. 2002a. Epistemicist models: comments on Gómez-Torrente and Graff. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64(1): 143-150.
Williamson, T. 2002b. Reply to Machina and Deutsch on Vagueness, Ignorance, and Margins for Error. Acta Analytica 17(29): 47-61.
Williamson, T. 2013. Identity and Discrimination, revised ed. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Wittgenstein, L. 1974. Tractatus logico-philosophicus, London and New York: Routledge.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2023 Emerson Carlos Valcarenghi
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Principia http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/index is licenced under a Creative Commons - Atribuição-Uso Não-Comercial-Não a obras derivadas 3.0 Unported.
Base available in www.periodicos.ufsc.br.
