Deferent Autonomy: An Epistemic Attack on Science Denialism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2025.e97735Keywords:
Epistemic Autonomy, Epistemic Deference, Scientific Denialism, Higher-Order Evidence, Evidence of TrustworthinessAbstract
It is rational for the agent to be epistemically autonomous and deferent. However, these epistemic attitudes seem to be intrinsically incompatible. This conflict is particularly critical in the case of scientific denialism, characterised by the deliberate denial of consensual scientific claims. The goal of this paper is to show that epistemic autonomy and deference are fully compatible and mutually exercisable epistemic attitudes, in such a way that the autonomous agent should defer to scientific consensus. We argue that it is rational for the epistemically autonomous agent to defer to scientific consensus because of the existence of a higher-order evidence regarding the trustworthiness of this consensus. The fundamental error of the denialist is to fail to recognise the evidence of trustworthiness in virtue of which one should defer to the scientific claim. The proper understanding of the relation between epistemic autonomy and deference is a fundamental step in proving the irrationality of scientific denialism and, subsequently, attacking it.
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