Intuition and Russell´s Paradox

Authors

  • Margaret Cuonzo Long Island University, Brooklyn Campus

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/%25x

Abstract

In this essay I will examine the role that intuition plays in Russell's parado; showing how different appraaches to intuition will license different treatments of the paradox. In addition, I will argue for a specific approach to the paradox, one that follows from the most plausible account of intuition. On this account, intuitions, though fallible, have episternic import. In addition, the intuitions involved in paradoxes point to something wrong with concept that leads to paradox. In the case of Russell's paradox, this is an ambiguity in the notion of a class.

Author Biography

Margaret Cuonzo, Long Island University, Brooklyn Campus

Presidente, Professor Associado do Departamento de Filosofia da Filosofia, Long Island University. Especialidades: Questões feministas em Ciência, Filosofia da Linguagem, Filosofia Paradoxos.

Published

2001-01-01

Issue

Section

Articles