The Cogito: Indubitability without Knowledge?

Authors

  • Stephen Hetherington University of New South Wales

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2009v13n1p85

Abstract

How should we understand both the nature, and the epistemic potential, of Descartes’s Cogito? Peter Slezak’s interpretation of the Cogito’s nature sees it strictly as a selfreferential kind of denial: Descartes cannot doubt that he is doubting. And what epistemic implications flow from this interpretation of the Cogito? We find that there is a consequent lack of knowledge being described by Descartes: on Cartesian grounds, indubitability is incompatible with knowing. Even as the Cogito halts doubt, therefore, it fails to be knowledge.

Author Biography

Stephen Hetherington, University of New South Wales

Professor at University of New South Wales.

Published

2009-01-01

Issue

Section

Articles