Maps, language, and concepts: toward a pluralist theory of representacional format
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2020v24n1p121Abstract
A great number of investigations suggest that cognition involves both linguistic and cartographic representations. These researches have motivated a pluralist conception of cognition; also, they have been used to clarify how maps differ from linguistic representations. However, the computational processes underlying the interphase between both kinds of representations deserve further attention. In this paper, I argue that, despite their differences, cartographic representations coexist and interact with linguistic representations in interesting ways.
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