From the Tarskian Definition of Truth to the Davidsonian Theory of Meaning and to Intensional Semantics: An Evaluative Perspective

Abstract

According to a dominant approach in philosophy of language and theoretical linguistics, the main task of semantic theory is to provide a recursive definition of truth at points of evaluation for the declarative sentences that make up the language under examination. A specific type of theory of truth (the definition of truth originally proposed by Alfred Tarski) is reinterpreted here as a theory of meaning. The idea of using definitions of truth to explain the meaning of linguistic expressions has its origin in the works of Donald Davidson, which exemplarily develop the connection between the Tarskian point of view and the concept of meaning. More recent developments in truth-condition semantics have come to reject Davidson’s extensionalist restrictions, specifying semantic content in terms of truth relativized to actual and counterfactual circumstances of evaluation. The present work aims to provide an evaluative perspective of the argumentative path that led from the Tarskian theory of truth to the Davidsonian theory of meaning and then to contemporary intensional semantics.