El Bayesianismo y la Justificación de la Inducción

Autores/as

  • Sílvio Pinto Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana - Iztalapa

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/%25x

Resumen

The appearance of Bayesicin inductive logic lias prompted a renewed op tirrusm about the posstbdity of justification of tnductwe rules The justifying argument for the 'rides of such a logic is the famous Dutch Book Argument (Ramsey-de Finettes theorent) The issue winch divides the theoreticians of induction concerns the question of whether this argument can indeed legitimize Bayesian conditmalization rides Here I will be firstly interested in showing that the Ramsey de Finetti's argument cannot establish that the use of the rnentioned conditionalization rides is the best option against Dutch Book betting strategnes except in special circum stances I suggest secondly that some presuppositicms of the Ramsey de Finetti s theorem (for instance, the principie of maximizaticrn of expected utility) themselves demand a justtfication.

Biografía del autor/a

Sílvio Pinto, Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana - Iztalapa

Departamento de Filosofia, Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana - Iztalapa, México.

Publicado

2002-01-01

Número

Sección

Articles