Russell´s Early Type Theory and the Paradox of Propositions
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/%25xResumen
The paradox of propositiOns, presented in Appenclix B of Russell's The Principies of Mathernatics (1903), is usually taken as Russell's principal motive, at the time, for moving from a simple to a ramified theory of types. I argue that this view is mistaken. A closer study of Russell's correspondence with Frege reveals that Russell carne to adopt a very different resolution of the paradox, calling into question not the simplicity of his early type theory but the simplicity of his early theory of propositions.Descargas
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2001-01-01
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Derechos de autor 2021 André Fuhrmann
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