Descubrimiento, justificación e inferencia a la mejor explicación

Autores/as

  • Rodolfo Gaeta Universidad de Buenos Aires

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2008v12n2p193

Resumen

In this paper I claim that the bias to pass from the acknowledgement of the explanatory virtues of a hypothesis to the belief that it is true or approximate to the truth is so strong that scientific realists can hardly elude that temptation. For that reason, some philosophers, like McMullin and Okasha, following Peirce and Hanson, participate of the conviction that the skill of founding scientific explanations bears the ability of founding true theories. But, this way, they pass the limits that they themselves had fixed and their attempt to overcome objections like the one which was formulated by van Fraassen against the inference to the best explanation fails.

Biografía del autor/a

Rodolfo Gaeta, Universidad de Buenos Aires

Doutor em Filosofia, é professor titular da Universidade Nacional de La Plata, Buenos Aires, e da Universidade Nacional de Luján. É co-autor de Aspectos críticos das Ciências Sociais. Entre a realidade e a metafísica, ao lado de Nélida Gentile e Susana Lucero (São Leopoldo: Editora Unisinos, 2008).

Publicado

2008-01-01

Número

Sección

Articles