Contextualism, skepticism, and invariantism

Authors

  • Stephen Jacobson Georgia State University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n3p375

Abstract

Michael Williams and Keith DeRose defend their different versions of contextualism on the grounds that contextualism gives a better account of the ordinary use of epistemic terms than invariantist competitors. One aim of this paper is to explain why their arguments do not succeed. A further aim is to show that the dispute between contextualists and invariantists portrayed by Williams and DeRose is a narrow interpretation of the dispute: there are important contextualist and invariantist positions which fall outside the scope of their arguments and which a full defense of contextualism should consider.

Author Biography

Stephen Jacobson, Georgia State University

Department of Philosophy

Georgia State University

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

USA

Published

2010-09-27

Issue

Section

Articles