O fatalismo relativístico
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n2p231Resumen
Neste artigo, defenderei que os argumentos deterministas ou fatalistas derivados desde a relatividade da simultaneidade (RoS) fracassam. Apesar dos autores clássicos (Rietdijk 1966, Putnam 1967 e Penrose 1989) referirem o argumento em termos de “determinismo”, Levin (2007) o faz em termos de “fatalismo relativístico”, ou ainda “fatalismo de série-B” (p. 440, footnote 17). O fatalismo relativístico é uma proposta surgida da suposta dependência que a propriedade de ser futuro (a futuridade) tem em relação à escolha de algum sistema de coordenadas (p. 433). Em um primeiro momento, irei me empenhar em explicar o argumento clássico, atribuindo ao mesmo uma dialéctica que justifica a sua referência nos termos de Levin. Em seguida, irei recusar o fatalismo relativístico usando diferentes estratégias para cada versão que o argumento pode assumir.
Citas
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