Disjunction: Its interpretations and L-truth

Miguel López Astorga

doi:10.5007/1808-1711.2022.e83692

Authors

Miguel López Astorga Universidad de Talca / Talca University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2022.e83692

Keywords:

Carnap, disjunction, interpretation, L-truth, mental model

Abstract

It has been proposed that disjunction has seven possible interpretations. Thus, it has been claimed that, in addition to the exclusive and inclusive ones, there are five more types of disjunctions. This paper analyzes those seven kinds of disjunction under Carnap’s approach. The goal is to find examples of L-true sentences corresponding to each of the interpretations. The methodology used to carry out the study is based on the theory of mental models. The results show that there can be L-true disjunctive sentences for every type of disjunction.

Author Biography

Miguel López Astorga, Universidad de Talca / Talca University

Académico del Instituto de Estudios Humanísticos "Juan Ignacio Molina" de la Universidad de Talca.

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