Representing Vague Opinion

Authors

  • Daniel J. McKaughan Boston College
  • John M. Drake University of Georgia

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n2p341

Abstract

Current supervaluation models of opinion, notably van Fraassen’s (1984; 1989; 1990; 1998; 2005; 2006) use of intervals to characterize vague opinion, capture nuances of ordinary reflection which are overlooked by classic measure theoretic models of subjective probability. However, after briefly explaining van Fraassen’s approach, we present two limitations in his current framework which provide clear empirical reasons for seeking a refinement. Any empirically adequate account of our actual judgments must reckon with the fact that these are typically neither uniform through the range of outcomes we take to be serious possibilities nor abrupt at the edges.

Author Biographies

Daniel J. McKaughan, Boston College

Philosophy Department, Assistant Professor

John M. Drake, University of Georgia

University of Geórgia

 

 

Published

2013-02-18

Issue

Section

Notes/Discussions