O que é Behaviorismo sobre a mente?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n2p249Resumo
É comum caracterizar-se as abordagens behavioristas sobre a mente como abordagens segundo as quais os acontecimentos mentais (ou psicológicos) são “disposições para comportamentos”. Por vezes diz-se que, para essas abordagens, se trataria de disposições para comportamentos publicamente observáveis ou externos, ou, ainda, “movimentos puramente físicos”, excluindo-se qualquer evento interno ao corpo como constitutivo de acontecimentos mentais. Neste trabalho, procura-se (i) identificar problemas em tais caracterizações encontradiças, mostrando que elas são demasiado restritivas ou, em alguns casos, demasiado amplas. Além disso, (ii) apresenta-se uma proposta alternativa de caracterização, aqui defendida como mais adequada, evitando esses problemas. Com base nessa caracterização alternativa, procura-se (iii) classificar algumas das chamadas teorias da mente corporificada (embodied mind) como comportamentais, não comportamentais, ou limítrofes entre uma coisa e outra.
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