The foundherentist view of justication by experience

Autores

  • James Ryan University of Western Ontario

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/%25x

Resumo

I show that Susan Haack's foundherentisit theory of justification accounts for the role of experience in the creation of justification (a role which has seemed mysterious since experience is not a proposition and therefore cannot, seemingly, support any proposition). Experience causes one to be justified in believing by causing certam beliefs — the truth of which is necessary to one's being justified — to be true. This is revealed when we notice that, as foundherentism holds, no belief is basic in the foundationalist sense, while all beliefs derive their jusfication from experience, contrary to coherentism.

Biografia do Autor

James Ryan, University of Western Ontario

Universidade de Western Ontario, Huron College, Departamento de Filosofia, em Londres, Ontarion, 3K7 N6A, no Canadá.

Downloads

Publicado

2000-01-01

Edição

Seção

Artigos