O disjuntivismo fenomênico como defesa do realismo ingênuo

Daniel Borgoni

doi:10.5007/1808-1711.2020v24n3p569

Autores

Daniel Borgoni Universidade Federal de São Paulo

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2020v24n3p569

Resumo

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Biografia do Autor

Daniel Borgoni, Universidade Federal de São Paulo

Doutor em filosofia pela Universidade Federal de São Paulo (UNIFESP). Fez estágio de pesquisa doutoral na Université du Québec à Montréal (UQÀM) com bolsa canadense do programa ELAP. No Brasil teve bolsa CAPES. Tem experiência em filosofia da mente, especificamente com o problema dos qualia, e em filosofia da percepção, cuja pesquisa trata da natureza da experiência perceptiva, com ênfase no disjuntivismo.

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