A gramática e os conteúdos da percepção

Daniel Debarry

doi:10.5007/1808-1711.2020v24n2p433

Autores

Daniel Debarry Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3597-3980

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2020v24n2p433

Resumo

O presente artigo tem o objetivo de discutir criticamente posições representacionistas e antirepresentacionistas no que se refere à experiência perceptual – ao mesmo tempo em que procura tomar posição em favor da primeira em detrimento da segunda. Tendo como ponto de partida o chamado “Debate entre John McDowell e Charles Travis”, pretendemos, no intuito de contornarmos as pressões antirepresentacionistas de Travis, defender aquelas que poderiam ser duas noções de ver como/que (seeing as/seeing that): de um lado, a ideia mcdowelliana de que conteúdos pensáveis (thinkables) podem figurar na experiência perceptual; de outro, uma proposta fenomenológica, que entende o conteúdo representacional da experiência perceptual em termos de seu significado.

Biografia do Autor

Daniel Debarry, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais

Doutorando em filosofia pela Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, UFMG.

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