On Mr Truetemp's Lack of Virtue

Autores

  • Howard Sankey University of Melbourne

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2022.e83748

Palavras-chave:

Mr Truetemp, Keith Lehrer, reliabilism, virtue epistemology

Resumo

Keith Lehrer’s case of Mr Truetemp, whose reliably formed true beliefs about the temperature are the result of a tempucomp implanted in his head, is designed as a counterexample to process reliabilism. In this short note, the example is explored from the point of view of the two main forms of virtue epistemology. It is suggested that Truetemp’s reliably formed true beliefs about the temperature fail to be virtuously formed in either the sense of the virtue reliabilist or the virtue responsibilist. Hence, virtue epistemology is able to handle the case of Mr Truetemp.

Biografia do Autor

Howard Sankey, University of Melbourne

Associate Professor

Philosophy 

Referências

Alfano, M. 2012. Expanding the Situationist Challenge to Responsibilist Virtue Epistemology. The Philosophical Quarterly 62(247): 223-249.

Baehr, J. 2006. Character, Reliability and Virtue Epistemology. The Philosophical Quarterly 56(223), 193-212.

Beebe, J. R. 2004. Reliabilism, Truetemp and New Perceptual Faculties. Synthese 140(3), 307-329.

Goldman, A. 1992. What is Justified Belief? In: Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences, p. 105-126. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.

Greco, J. 1999. Agent Reliabilism. Philosophical Perspectives 13: 273-296.

Lehrer, K. 1990. Theory of Knowledge. London: Routledge.

Lepock, C. 2011. Unifying the Intellectual Virtues. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXXXIII(1), 106-128.

Sosa, E. 2007. A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume I, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Zagzebski, L. 2003. The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good. Metaphilosophy 34(1-2), 12-28.

Publicado

2022-08-19

Edição

Seção

Artigos