The many faces of the Liar Paradox
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2024.e96700Palavras-chave:
Liar Paradox, Truth, Self-reference, Semantic ParadoxResumo
The Liar Paradox is a classic argument that creates a contradiction by reflection on a sentence that attributes falsity to itself: ‘this sentence is false’. In our paper we will discuss the ways in which the Liar sentence (and its paradoxical argument) can be represented in first-order logic. The key to the representation is to use first-order logic to model a self-referential language. We will also discuss several related sentences, like the Liar cycles, the empirical versions of the Liar and the Truth teller sentences.
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