Naturalismo e existencialismo na teoria moral de Richard Hare
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2009v8n2p247Abstract
Em um artigo de 1966, Amartya Sen procurou mostrar que mesmo Richard Hare, um devoto explícitodo antinaturalismo em ética, ainda que inadvertidamente, incorreu num tipo de naturalismo que Senintitulou de existencial. Neste breve artigo, traço um resumo dessa crítica à teoria de Hare, em especial,da chamada “Lei de Hume”, a qual Sen preferiu apropriadamente intitular “Regra de Hare”. Pretendomostrar como esse tipo peculiar de “existencialismo” nos conduz, ainda que sob o possível protesto deHare e seus seguidores, a conclusões subjetivistas e relativistas sobre a moralidade.
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