Moral responsibility and the principle of avoidable blame
Abstract
Many now accept that Frankfurt-style cases refute the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP). But, in this paper I argue that even if Frankfurt-style cases refute PAP they do not refute a related principle: the principle of avoidable blame (PAB). My argument develops from the observation that an agent in a Frankfurt-style case can be aware of the nature of their situation without this undermining their moral responsibility. I then argue that PAB captures all that is important about PAP such that the refutation of PAP is of no concern as long as PAB survives.Downloads
Veröffentlicht
2004-01-01
Ausgabe
Rubrik
Artigos
Lizenz
![Licença Creative Commons](http://i.creativecommons.org/l/by-nc-nd/3.0/88x31.png)
This obra is licensed under a Creative Commons Atribuição-NãoComercial-SemDerivações 4.0 Internacional