Equilíbrio reflexivo amplo e a revisibilidade das crenças morais
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2015v14n3p473Abstract
O método do equilíbrio reflexivo amplo é um modelo epistemológico em filosofia moral cuja grande virtude é a capacidade para acomodar o que pode ser chamada de uma atitude revisionista: nenhuma crença moral é imune à revisão e qualquer crença moral está sujeita a ser descartada se se mostrar incoerente com novas informações ou com um novo e melhor sistema coerente de crenças. Por definir a justificação como uma questão de ajuste mútuo entre crenças, alguns filósofos defendem que o equilíbrio reflexivo amplo é um método coerentista e que apenas uma epistemologia não fundacionalista poderia acomodar o revisionismo. O objetivo deste ensaio é argumentar contra essas duas teses. Será proposta uma interpretação fundacionalista para o equilíbrio reflexivo amplo que é claramente revisionista. Será argumentado que o equilíbrio reflexivo atribui um status epistêmico especial aos juízos morais ponderados afirmados com um alto nível de comprometimento, o que é incompatível com uma interpretação coerentista.
References
AUDI, Robert. A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. Third Edition. New York: Routledge, 2011.
_____. The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.
_____. The Structure of Justification. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
BONJOUR, Laurence; SOSA, Ernest. Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs Externalism, Foundations vs Virtues. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003.
BRANDT, Richard. A Theory of the Good and the Right. New York: Prometheus Books, 1998.
BRINK, David. Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
DANIELS, Norman. Justice and Justification: Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
EBERTZ, Roger. Is Reflective Equilibrium a Coherentist Model?. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, v. 23, n. 2, p. 193-214, 1993.
FOLEY, Richard. A Theory of Epistemic Rationality. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1987.
GOODMAN, Nelson. Sense and Certainty. The Philosophical Review, v. 61, n. 2, p.160-167, 1952.
HABERMAS, Jurgen. Reconciliation through the public use of reason: Remarks on John Rawls’ Political Liberalism. The Journal of Philosophy, v. 92, n. 3, p. 109-131, 1995.
HOLMGREN, Margaret. The Wide and Narrow of Reflective Equilibrium. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, v. 19, n. 1, p. 43-60, 1989.
MIKHAIL, John. Elements of Moral Cognition: Rawls' Linguistic Analogy and the Cognitive Science of Moral and Legal Judgment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
RAWLS, John. A Theory of Justice. Revised Edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999.
_____. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001.
_____. Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics. The Philosophical Review, v. 60, n. 2, p. 177-197, 1951.
_____. Political Liberalism. Expanded Edition. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
_____. The Independence of Moral Theory. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, v. 48, p. 5-22, 1975.
SAYRE-MCCORD, Geoffrey. Coherentism and the Justification of Moral Beliefs. In: SHAFER-LANDAU, Russ. Ethical Theory. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007. p. 123-139.
SCANLON, Thomas. Being Realistic About Reasons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
_____. Rawls on Justification. In: FREEMAN, Samuel (Ed.). The Cambridge Companion to Rawls. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. p. 139-168.
SCHEFFLER, Israel. On Justification and Commitment. The Journal of Philosophy, v. 51, n. 6, p.180-190, 1954.
SMITH, Michael. The Moral Problem. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1994.
SOSA, Ernest. Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
TIMMONS, Mark. Morality without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
THOMAS, Alan. Value and Context: The Nature of Moral and Political Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Authors retain copyright and publication rights over their works, without restrictions.
Upon submitting their work, authors grant ethic@ the exclusive right of first publication, with the work simultaneously licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) 4.0 International License. This license allows third parties to remix, adapt, and build upon the published work, provided that proper credit is given to the authorship and to the original publication in this journal.
Authors are also permitted to enter into additional contracts, separately, for the non-exclusive distribution of the published version of the work in this journal (for example: deposit in an institutional repository, make it available on a personal website, publish translations, or include it as a book chapter), provided that authorship and the initial publication in ethic@ are acknowledged.
