Cognitive neuroscience and moral epistemology: on the irreductibility of knowing-how to knowing-that
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n1p49Abstract
This paper shows that moral knowing-how is non-reducible to knowing-that, that is, to propositional knowledge. Taking into consideration the main contributions of cognitive neuroscience to moral epistemology, it argues that moral knowing-how cannot be analyzed in terms of knowing-that. Afterwards, it criticizes the recent attempts, specially made by Stanley, to show that all knowledge is propositional. Finally, the paper illustrates how moral knowledge can be found in attitudes such as knowing-how to take of a vulnerable individual, knowing-how to respect a person etc. The conclusion then is that moral knowledge is not identical with factual knowledge.
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