Phenomenal Disjunctivism as a defense of the Naive Realism

Authors

  • Daniel Borgoni Universidade Federal de São Paulo

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2020v24n3p569

Keywords:

perceptual experience, veridical perception, hallucination, disjunctivism, phenomenal character

Abstract

Phenomenal disjunctivism is put foward in defense of naive realism, the conception of veridical perception according to which physical objects constitute perceptual experience and determine its phenomenal character. However, according to the causal argument we can produce veridical perceptual experiences without physical objects. In defense of naïve realism, phenomenal disjunctivists propose responses to the causal argument mainly based on the characterization of the nature of hallucinatory experience. My aim is to defend that phenomenal disjunctivists do not have succeed in defending naïve realism against the causal argument.

Author Biography

Daniel Borgoni, Universidade Federal de São Paulo

Doutor em filosofia pela Universidade Federal de São Paulo (UNIFESP). Fez estágio de pesquisa doutoral na Université du Québec à Montréal (UQÀM) com bolsa canadense do programa ELAP. No Brasil teve bolsa CAPES. Tem experiência em filosofia da mente, especificamente com o problema dos qualia, e em filosofia da percepção, cuja pesquisa trata da natureza da experiência perceptiva, com ênfase no disjuntivismo.  

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Published

2020-12-15

Issue

Section

Articles