Anti-realism and logical expressivism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2021.e80108Abstract
In his work, Robert Brandom presents an expressivist theory about logic. According to him, logic plays the expressive role of making explicit inferential relations implicit in our linguistic practices. Inferential relations constitute the content of our concepts. In our paper, we explore the thesis that Brandom’s logical expressivism is an anti-realist theory about logic. Logical realists defend the independent existence of logical facts in relation to our cognitive and linguistic practices. In this view, logic truly describes the structure of reality, as it represents logical facts. By contrast, logical anti-realists do not commit to the independent existence of logical facts to understand the nature of logic. In contrast to a realist view, we show that Brandom’s anti-realism renders a simple and economic ontology and also the foundation of a pragmatist alternative to examine the normativity of logic, the phenomenon of rival logics and the nature of our rationality.
References
Amattucci, M. (2014). Frege: Verdade e Pensamento na Lógica (1897) e em Der Gedanke. Problemata: Revista Internacional de Filosofı́a, 5(2), pp. 344-357.
Başkent, C., & Ferguson, T. M. (Eds.). (2019). Graham Priest on Dialetheism and Paraconsistency. Dordrecht: Springer.
Batens, D. et al. (Eds.). (2000). Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic. Baldock: Research Studies Press.
Beall, J. C., & Restall, G. (2006). Logical Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Blackburn, S. (1997). Dicionário Oxford de filosofia. Trad. Danilo Marcondes. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar
Brandom, R. (2001) Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Brandom, R. (1994). Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Brandom, R. (2008). Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Burge, T. (1996). Frege on Knowing the Third Realm. In: M. Schirn (org.) Frege: Importance and Legacy. Berlin: de Gruyter, pp 347-368.
Dummett, M. (1978). Truth and Other Enigmas. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Dummett, M. (1991). Objectivity and Reality in Lotze and Frege. In: Frege and Other Philosophers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 29-57.
Frege, G. (2002). Investigações Lógicas. Org. e Trad. Paulo Alcoforado. Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS.
Hacker, P. (1997). Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein. Bristol: Thoemmes Press.
Lapointe, S. (2014). Bolzano’s Logical Realism. In: P. Rush (ed.). The Metaphysics of Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp 189-208.
Loux, M. (2006). Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction. 3ed. New York: Routledge
Maddy, P. (2014). A Second Philosophy of Logic. In: P. Rush (ed.). The Metaphysics of Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp 93-108.
McSweeney, M. (2018). Realismo Lógico e a Metafı́sica da Lógica. Trad. Evelyn Erickson. Recife: Perspectiva Filosófica 45(1), pp 122-140.
Miller, A. (2019). Realism. Edward N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Winter 2019 Edition. Disponı́vel online. Acesso em 6 de fev. 2020
Okasha, S. (2002). Philosophy of Science: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Priest, G. (2000). Motivations for Paraconsistency: the Slippery Slope from Classical Logic to Dialetheism. In: Batens D. et al. (eds.). Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic. Baldock, UK: Research Studies Press, pp 223-232.
Priest, G. (2006). Doubt Truth to Be a Liar. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Priest, G. (2008). An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic. 2ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Priest, G. (2014). Revising Logic. In: P. Rush (ed.). The Metaphysics of Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp 211-223.
Priest, G. (2019). Some Comments and Replies. In: Başkent, C., & Ferguson, T. M. (Eds.). Graham Priest on Dialetheism and Paraconsistency. Dordrecht: Springer, pp 575-675.
Putnam, H. (1981). Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Putnam, H. (1987). The Many Faces of Realism. La-Salle, IL.: Open Court.
Rush, P. (2014). Logical Realism. In: P. Rush (ed.). The Metaphysics of Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp 13-31.
Sellars, W. (2008). Empirismo e Filosofia da Mente. Trad. Sofia Stein. Petrópolis, RJ: Vozes.
Sider, T. (2013). Writing the Book of the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Silva, M. (2016). Persuasion over Convincement: On the Role of Conversion in Logical Conflicts between Realists and Anti-realists. Arlei Moreno (org.). Wittgenstein e seus aspectos 1ed. Campinas: Coleção CLE, v.77, pp 141-164.
Sluga, H. (1976). Frege as a rationalist. Schirn M. (ed.). Studies on Frege Stuttgart: Problemata, pp 27-47.
Sluga, H. (1975). Frege and the Rise of Analytical Philosophy. Inquiry 18(4), pp 471-487.
Tanaka, K. (2019). Priest’s Anti-Exceptionalism, Candrakirti and Paraconsistency. In: Başkent, C., & Ferguson, T. M. (Eds.). Graham Priest on Dialetheism and Paraconsistency. Dordrecht: Springer, pp 127-138.
Weiner, J. (1995a). Realismbei Frege: Reply to Burge. Synthese 102(3), pp 363-382.
Weiner, J. (1995b). Burge’s Literal Interpretation of Frege. Mind 104(415), pp 585-597.
Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical Investigations. Trad. G. E. Moore & Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Wright, C. (1985). Frege’s conception of Numbers as Objects. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2021 Marcos Silva, Acácio Ferreira
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Principia http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/index is licenced under a Creative Commons - Atribuição-Uso Não-Comercial-Não a obras derivadas 3.0 Unported.
Base available in www.periodicos.ufsc.br.
