Propositional Attitudes, intentionality, and Lawful Behaviors
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/%25xResumen
This paper aims to discuss Quine’s last analysis of propositional attitudes as involving intentionality and as regards human action and the very sub-ject matter of social sciences. As to this problem, Quine acquiesces in both Davidson’s anomalous monism and Dennett’s intentional stance. An al-ternative analysis is here presented, which is based on Howard Rachlin’s teleological behaviorism. Some problems regarding this approach are also considered. Intentionality and rationality are still to be saved, but they are construed according to a lawful perspective to human behavior and social contexts of action.Descargas
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2003-01-01
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Derechos de autor 2021 Luiz Henrique de A. Dutra
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