Formal inferences and their relationships to knowledge acquisition: mental models and semantic links

Miguel López Astorga; Leyla Danae Torres-Bravo

doi:10.5007/1808-1711.2020v24n2p325

Autores/as

Miguel López Astorga Universidad de Talca https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6004-0587
Leyla Danae Torres-Bravo Universidad de Talca

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2020v24n2p325

Resumen

The mental model theory is an approach with clear psychological, linguistic, and cognitive consequences. This paper delves into some of the epistemological conclusions that can be drawn from it. In particular, it addresses the process why knowledge acquisition can modify the inferences people tend to make. That process is described by means of an example based on a well-known logical schema related to the conditional: Modus Tollendo Tollens.

Biografía del autor/a

Miguel López Astorga, Universidad de Talca

Full professor at the Institute of Humanistic Studies "Juan Ignacio Molina," University of Talca

Leyla Danae Torres-Bravo, Universidad de Talca

Lecturer at the Institute of Humanistic Studies "Juan Ignacio Molina," University of Talca

Citas

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